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Nueva incursion aerea Israeli sobre Siria

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  • Nueva incursion aerea Israeli sobre Siria

    Los Israelis ya confirmaron lo que era un secreto a voces, que el dia 6 de Setiembre realizaron un ataque aereo en territorio Sirio. Se especula que fue sobre instalaciones nucleares con tecnologia NCoreana. Tambien se habla de puestos para el abastecimientos de armas para el Hisbola.

    Lo que a causado revuelo en Siria e Iran, es que luego de haber gastado billones en lo ultimo en sistemas antiaeros Rusos, supuestamente impenetrable y capaz inclusive de detectar aviones Selth, (segun los Rusos), esta fue facilmente burlada por los sistemas electronicos Israelis.

    En Siria se habla inclusive de estafa Rusa.

    Los Iranies ahora si estan preocupados, sobre todo por sus instalaciones nucleares.

    Al parecer fue la practica previa a la incursion sobre Iran.

    Ojala que antes que en Peru botemos nuevamente la plata, tomemos nota de estos acontecimientos.

    Disculpen que no ponga las fuentes pero estoy seguro que ya mas de uno ya sabe sabe de esta informacion.


    "No es la especie más fuerte la que sobrevive, ni la más inteligente, sino la que mejor responde al cambio."

    Charles Darwin

  • #2
    Oriente Medio, Irak, Iran, Israel, USA. Todo lo que queremos saber y nadie nos cuenta

    es la mas amplia.
    A defensive combat is historically almost always a strategic failure.


    • #3
      Uff...Me imagino que los más recalcitrantes defensores del material rusosky en la tierra de Chabuca Granda, señalarán que Arquitecto es un forista chileno....



      • #4

        Hola, aqui se puede ver según los sirios la incursión por donde fue.
        Además los turcos encontraron en su territorio supuestos tanques de combustible arrojados por los aviones



        • #5
          El sistema Panstyr-S1E no es un sistema adecuado para interceptar aviones volando a gran altitud, para los aviones atacantes era suficiente con volar fuera de su rango y usar bombas guiadas. El resto de los sistemas sirios adoleceria de obsolescencia

          Israel, Syria: Upgrades and an Unchanged Air Defense Dynamic
          October 03, 2007 14 13 GMT


          Russia reportedly has sent technicians to help Syria upgrade its air defense network following the Israeli air force (IAF)'s Sept. 6 use of a new electronic warfare system to penetrate Syrian airspace. While the existence of both the new Israeli system and the Russian assistance are quite possible, neither alters the fundamental dynamic between the IAF and the Syrian air defense network.


          The Israeli air force (IAF) employed a new electronic warfare system in its Sept. 6 raid on Syria, and Russia afterward sent technicians to help upgrade the Syrian air defense network, London daily The Times reported Oct. 2. Neither of these plausible possibilities would alter the fundamental dynamic between the IAF and the Syrian air defense command.

          With 60,000 troops, the Syrian air defense command is larger than the country's navy and air force combined. The country is covered by some 150 surface-to-air missile batteries, with the heaviest concentrations along the Israeli border, along the Mediterranean coast and at Damascus. Reportedly, minor reshuffling has occurred lately to improve coverage of Syria's borders with Turkey and Iraq.

          But despite its scale, the Syrian air defense system has largely faded to obsolescence. The bulk of Damascus' strategic defensive systems were delivered by the mid-80s, and the Arab nation's source of meaningful air defense assets evaporated with the Soviet Union.

          The core of the Syrian air defense system remains the SA-2 and SA-3. The SA-2 was first fielded more than half a century ago, and the SA-3 just few years later. Syria's longest-range air defense asset is the SA-5 "Gammon" (a design that is more than 40 years old). This system was soundly defeated by U.S. electronic countermeasures (ECM) and anti-radiation missiles in Libya in 1986.

          But systems can be upgraded, of course. Russia offers all manner of hardware and software upgrades (some of which might now be under way) and even Ukraine and Serbia peddle equipment and upgrades relevant to the Syrians' network. Meanwhile, Syria has certainly not remained idle in the past decade. Damascus learned much not only from the devastating air campaign against Iraq in 1991 but also from the subsequent interactions of the remnants of Iraqi air defenses and U.S. and British enforcement of the two no-fly zones imposed on Iraq after Desert Storm.

          Though there are certainly air defense lessons for Damascus to learn, Syrian air defense has nothing like the integration, sophistication, command and control, or readiness that Iraq demonstrated before Desert Storm, and the quality of personnel is just as important. The alertness of a Bosnian Serb SA-6 crew brought down a U.S. F-16 in 1995 and the ingenuity of a Serbian SA-3 crew in 1999 brought down the only F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter ever lost to hostile fire. Neither Syria's exercises nor its responsiveness to repeated IAF incursions exemplify this kind of training or readiness. Overall, the Syrian military is plagued by much more fundamental issues like nepotism, corruption and a garrison mentality.

          Many of the weaknesses of the Syrian air defense network also inescapably are linked to the hardware itself. The SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 systems are either static or extremely difficult to move, making them easy to avoid, easy to target with electronic countermeasures and easy to kill. Both the radars and the missiles themselves are susceptible to modern ECM and decoys (and Israeli upgrades far outpace any upgrades Syria has been able to make). The missile batteries also must be in active mode and radiating to have any kind of lethality, but his is when they are most vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles. The SA-6 -- which Syria also fields in great numbers -- is mobile, but it suffers from these other vulnerabilities. Syria has attempted to compensate for its air defense system's obsolescence through density, concentrating these systems in key areas with heavily overlapping coverage.

          The sheer density of Syrian defenses in key locations means its air defenses cannot be dismissed out of hand. But density and other half-measures are crude counters in the era of GPS-guided and standoff munitions. Illustrating this point, the IAF repeatedly has overflown Latakia and might have penetrated the dense network along the Mediterranean coast twice Sept. 6.

          Syria probably could bring down a handful of Israeli warplanes in a full-scale IAF onslaught. But Syria lacks the equipment, integration and technology to oppose that onslaught effectively, meaning it does not act as a deterrent to an Israeli attack.

          Modern air defense does not come cheaply no matter how one approaches the matter. Both the United States and Israel ensure first and foremost through superior airpower. Neither country has been in a position where its air superiority has been challenged meaningfully in decades. Moreover, multiple successful campaigns of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) have lent validity to -- if not credence to the superiority of -- the concept of airpower-based air defense.

          Due to geopolitical realities, the Soviet Union was far more focused on land-based air defense for the entire Cold War. Moscow constructed a formidable air defense network that the United States and NATO took extremely seriously. But this system came at a massive cost.

          Syria's network was only possible through the sponsorship of the Soviets, who armed Syria to counter U.S. sponsorship of Israel. Following a humiliating defeat of Syria by the IAF in which the Israelis completely dominated the air and the electromagnetic spectrum in 1982, the Soviets shipped coveted long-range SA-5s to Damascus.

          Today, Moscow is selling only multiple-launch equipment for the SA-18 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and some 50 truck-mounted Panstyr-S1E close-in air defense systems (for which the United Arab Emirates is known to have spent nearly $750 million, or roughly half Syria's entire annual defense budget). Most other rumors concerning Syrian acquisitions involve this category of systems. While capable and dangerous, these systems have extremely limited range and cannot provide Damascus with a meaningful air defense capability. Even in the cramped Golan Heights, the threat they pose would be to low-flying close-air-support aircraft and helicopters. Syrian cannot win a war with that kind of coverage.

          Today's equivalent to Soviet support in the early 1980s would be Moscow shipping modern S-300 batteries to Damascus in an immediate and unequivocal response to the Sept. 6 IAF incursion. Syria is desperate for the S-300 system, and rumors of its delivery have circulated for nearly a decade without corroboration, but it is unclear whether Syria can afford even a single battery, much less sufficient numbers for a systemic upgrade. This purchase would require both a seller and a generous financier. Instead, the most active role Russia is rumored to be playing involves sending some technicians to help upgrade the system.

          The problem for Syria is that today's Kremlin differs from the Soviet Kremlin. If Russia had the resources the Soviets enjoyed, Moscow might consider it. But production is limited, and many considerations surround air defense exports. Ultimately, the neglect that Syrian air defense acquisition and modernization have suffered in the last decade cannot easily be undone.

          Russian technicians -- even exceptionally well-funded and well-equipped ones -- cannot fundamentally alter the dynamic between Syria's air defense network and the IAF. Syria occupies the unfortunate position of being the only military power openly hostile toward Israel and directly contiguous to the Jewish state -- which of course continues to enjoy U.S. sponsorship and all the technological advantages such sponsorship entails. Even with Soviet sponsorship, Syria repeatedly failed to hold up in the face of the IAF (even when its equipment was more current), and that is not a dynamic that will change soon.

          Editado por última vez por Kuntur; 04/10/2007, 03:02:33.