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EEUU vs Rusia: Nueva Guerra Fría

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  • private joker
    respondió
    me referia al de friedman

    Originalmente publicado por private joker Ver Mensaje
    que buen analisis ******, escrito por un norteamericano que ve las cosas como son. Vamos en circulos o en habla perucha, todos vuelven.
    PJ
    me referia al de friedman

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  • private joker
    respondió
    que buen analisis ******, escrito por un norteamericano que ve las cosas como son. Vamos en circulos o en habla perucha, todos vuelven.
    PJ

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  • private joker
    respondió
    excellent

    Originalmente publicado por Kuntur Ver Mensaje
    The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy (1/2)
    September 2, 2008 | 1705 GMT
    By George Friedman

    The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:

    The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
    The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
    The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.

    In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.

    The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

    On Sunday, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):

    First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.

    Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.

    Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
    Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.

    Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.

    Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”

    The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.

    The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”

    Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.

    These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.

    This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.

    http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medve...rican_strategy
    very precise analysis, too bad the US goverment doesnt know how to read or understand what its reading.

    pj

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  • economista
    respondió
    La mitad de Ucrania es rusa. Gran parte de la economia de muchas familias ucranianas depende de los gastos de la flota rusa en Sebastopol. es el mismo caso de los paises que se independizaron de Yugoslavia, Checoslovaquia y la ex Union sovietica.

    Despues de haber pasado hambre y haber sido ninguneados y humillados por occidente, los rusos ahora tiene dinero extra por el petroleo y las exportaciones de trigo y metales, estan mucho mejor armados, ven que occidente tiene conflictos serios con los musulmanes y que pueden tener a Venezuela mas sus satelites como un eventual aliado.

    La intervencion rusa en Ucrania es evidente. la ha visto hasta Andrea Boccelli. De repente la primera ministra y su partido se dividen del gobierno pro Otan.

    ya los rusos dijeron que es de su interes estrategico proteger a las ex republicassiovieticas de ser fagocitados por la otan despues de que EEUU estuvo preparando el escudo anti misiles en la puerta falsa de Rusia.

    Para mi concepto, el riesgo de una nueva polarizacno que pueda llevar a conflictos muy serios, es cada vez mayor. Occidente perdio el trend e la historia al no conseguir que estos paises se integren a la Otan apenas salieron del socialismo. Ahora que Rusia esta mas fuerte, empieza a resistirse.

    Si se quiere evitar un conflicto mayor, occidene debe dejar que los rusos que habitan en otros paioses se regresen a Rusia porque va a resultar imposible evitarlo y lo unico que se va a conseguir es que los halcones rusos se hagan mas fuertes, que las confrontaciones se agudicen y sobre todo, el efecto para los latinoamericanos es que Venezuela se fortalecera si consigue lo que esta buscando, una alianza con Rusia para poder enfrentarse con EEUU en mejor pie.

    Ya vimos como Daniel Ortega, un titere de tercer nivel del Chavez, declaró su apoyo a la independencia de Osetia del Sur cuando hace unos meses no sabia ni siquiera que existia Georgia y creia que el mar negro quedaba en Africa.

    En retrospectiva, Bush ha estado provocando a los rusos en forma creciente y dentro de sus planes militaristas y confrontacionales, estaba esta reaccion que entre otras cosas hace ver a Obama como un moreno raquitico a quien los arabes y los rusos le van a robar la billetera y el reloj.

    El analisis de Friedman es correcto. Europa lo ultimo que quiere ver es una guerra en su territorio o en el vecindario.

    Desde el punto de vista militar, observamos que la doctrina rusa no ha cambiado un milimetro desde la segunda guerra mundial. Lanzar una gigantesca fuerza con gran potencia de fuego masivo multidireccional. Y no la cambia ni siquiera si esta en una guerra asimetrica como en el caso de Yugoslavia. Ademas ha regresado a la vieja tecnica de financiar y manejar partidos a su favor para crear la division entre sus enemigos. Lo mismo que practicaba la Cuba de Fidel Castro y que este le ha enseñado a Chavez.
    Editado por última vez por economista; 04/09/2008, 22:16:22.

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  • Alexm29
    respondió
    Originalmente publicado por delta1 Ver Mensaje
    Ukrania mañana firma su ingreso a la otan
    Fijate en la noticia que acabas de poner... Ucrania no se va a unir a la OTAN mas aun con eso, la primer minnistro esta en contra de esa postura, esta ganando aliados y para colmo es la primera en intencion de voto para las proximas elecciones.

    Ucrania Ya nose va a meter mas en ese conflicto por loss problemas internos que esta generando... y mas aun probablemente despues del cambio de gobierno tengan una politica mas pegada a Rusia, pero aun no pasanlas elecciones asi que no se puede decir con certeza.

    Saludos

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