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Sistema Buk M-1 una solucion a nuestras necesidades.

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  • #66
    GC, te estas perdiendo de lejos
    para que tus propios misiles no te maten, debes introducir un codigo al sistema IFF, tanto al avion como al misil. (ultra-secreto y cambiable a diario)
    es por eso que el Buk se bajo al Backfire, y eso es lo que paso a los Tornados
    aparte que el trigger happy yank hizo deacuerdo al yankee SOP
    fire first, ask latter.

    asi que tal comentario sobre el Buk, no venia al caso, estabas totalmente fuera de foco.

    el loco.


    • #67
      Pues, francamente no viene al caso estudiar la efectividad de los nuevos sistemas de defensa aerea SAM fabricados por la federacion rusa a partir de lo que fueron sus antecesores decadas atras ni los conflictos de hace 20 anhos...Hoy en dia incorporan las mas avanzadas prestaciones y el nivel de efectividad es indiscutiblemente superior y a la par de sus contemporaneos occidentales.
      Seguidamente las conclusiones del grupo de estudio de APA:

      The study of SAM effectiveness in air campaigns between the 1960s and the last decade may span a period of almost a half century, but in every one of these campaigns the numerically dominant SAM systems were Soviet designs which were developed during the 1950s and 1960s, specifically the S-75 / SA-2 Guideline, the S-125 / SA-3 Goa and the 2K12 / SA-6 Gainful, with sporadic use of the S-200VE / SA-5 Gammon and 9K33 / SA-8 Gecko.

      In comparison with SAM systems currently available on the global market, offered by Russian and Chinese manufacturers, these legacy SAM systems are inferior in many respects:
      1. Modern SAM engagement and acquisition radars are designed from the outset to be highly resistant to jamming, and typically deliver higher peak power-aperture performance to engage lower signature targets;
      2. Some modern SAM engagement radars are claimed to provide a basic LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) capability, making their detection and tracking difficult;
      3. Nearly all modern SAM systems and supporting radars are highly mobile, engineered from the outset for “hide, shoot and scoot” operations;
      4. Modern SAMs are all kinematically superior to their Cold War era predecessors, by virtue of better rocket motor technology, and digital guidance, yielding greater engagement ranges and terminal endgame manoeuvre performance.
      Contemporary SAM systems in these categories include the Russian SA-20 (S-300PMU1, S-300PMU2), Chinese HQ-9/FD-2000 and Russian SA-21 (S-400). These are modern systems with highly jam resistant radars, and if the Chinese are correct, basic low probability of intercept capability.

      These systems will be difficult to locate, jam and guide anti-radiation missiles against. No less importantly they have modern highly automated digital fire control systems, not unlike Western SAMs of this era. The demands for proficiency and technical understanding of operation by crews seen in early Cold War SAM systems no longer exist – operators have sophisticated LCD panel displays with synthetic presentation. In deployment, these systems are heavily automated, using mostly hydraulic rams to elevate and unfold key system components, and thus little operator skill is needed to set up or relocate a battery – most can shoot and scoot in five minutes.

      The difficulties arising from technological evolution in long range or area defence SAM systems have been exacerbated by the evolution of associated operational doctrine, which now sees the deployment of specialised equipment intended to defend SAM batteries from attack. These include:
      1. The development and deployment of advanced point defence SAMs and SPAAGMs to engage and destroy guided munitions launched against SAM sites;
      2. The development and deployment of modern emitting decoys to defeat geolocation receivers and guided munition seekers;
      3. The development and deployment of active and passive electronic, optical and infrared countermeasures to defeat guided munition seekers;
      4. The development and deployment of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) sensor fusion systems to defeat electronic countermeasures, and to an extent, low observables.
      As a result, a modern IADS equipped with current Russian and Chinese SAM systems will be very difficult to defeat by non-lethal and lethal suppression or kill techniques. A large fraction of guided munitions launched will be shot down, or their guidance defeated.

      In conclusion, the perception that contemporary Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.
      Aut viam inveniam aut faciam