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Finalmente (y economizando mi tiempo, porque no espero respuesta coherente), y hablando de su fuente y de ese quasi-meme que colgó sobre “2,000 civiles muertos”, nuevamente el informe de las Naciones Unidas "opina"

distinto que Ud.:

V Casualty Figures

53. In its report, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Human Rights Watch documented some 500 civilian deaths in 90 separate incidents. It concluded: "on the basis available on these ninety incidents that as few as 488 and as many as 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing. Between 62 and 66 percent of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in just twelve incidents. These twelve incidents accounted for 303 to 352 civilian deaths. These were the only incidents among the ninety documented in which ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed." Ten of these twelve incidents were included among the incidents which were reviewed with considerable care by the committee (see para. 9 above) and our estimate was that between 273 and 317 civilians were killed in these ten incidents. Human Rights Watch also found the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia to be largely credible on the basis of its own filed research and correlation with other sources. A review of this publication indicates it provides an estimated total of approximately 495 civilians killed and 820 civilians wounded in specific documented instances. For the purposes of this report, the committee operates on the basis of the number of persons allegedly killed as found in both publications. It appears that a figure similar to both publications would be in the range of 500 civilians killed.

Note que el párrafo menciona que esta cifra (500 civiles) coincide con estimados del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores del propio lado serbio. No tengo la menor idea de dónde puede haber salido la cifra mencionada en el panfleto que Ud. diseminó (“2,000 muertos”), pero tampoco me sorprende: Internet aguanta todo (y más aun si uno se remite a fuentes como iraqsolidaridad.org).

En todo caso, no me sorprendería que muchas bajas colaterales hayan sido resultado de las propias acciones serbias. CNN mostró imágenes dramáticas de artillería antiaérea y SAMs disparados frenéticamente sobre Belgrado. Esa munición (rondas de hasta 100mm) y misiles del tamaño de un poste de teléfono (SA-3) tienen que regresar a tierra una vez que fallan su objetivo. Dónde piensa que cayeron?

Originalmente publicado por Centinela Ver Mensaje

Que bueno que haya alguien preocupado por esos temas:

YUGOSLAVIA: Bombas de fragmentación de la OTAN matan 100 civiles

http://www.ipsnoticias.net/1999/05/yugoslavia-bombas-de-fragmentacion-de-la-otan-matan-100-civiles/

La OTAN utiliza polémicas bombas de fragmentación en su ofensiva aérea contra Yugoslavia, como las ocho que hoy mataron al menos a 100 civiles e hirieron a 50 en la aldea kosovar de Korisa. La semana pasada, ese tipo de bombas, cuya prohibición exige la organización de derechos humanos Human Rights Watch, de Nueva York, […]

"Ni el monstruo más cruel haría eso": RT repasa los 78 días de la barbarie de la OTAN en Yugoslavia

https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/123030-monstro-cruel-haria-rt-repasa-dias-barbarie-otan-yugoslavia

Este 24 de marzo se cumplen 15 años del inicio de los bombardeos de la OTAN en Yugoslavia. Con motivo de la fecha, dos periodistas de RT —la serbia Jelena Milincic y la estadounidense Anissa Naouai— tratan de describir los horrores de la guerra.

Que argumento mas huevo*frito, tanto las bombas rusas como las norteamericanas han matado civiles, y las bombas de la OTAN obviamente que se llevan el premio a la mediocridad, el atraso y la crueldad.

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http://www.iraqsolidaridad.org/2013/docs/Dirk_muertos_iraq_2013.html

Centinela, veo que pasan los años y sigue fiel a su estilo. Se lo dije antes, pero cada vez se hace más relevante:

Originalmente publicado por Goliath Ver Mensaje

Por pura curiosidad Centinela, existe alguna discusion (una sola siquiera) en la que no apoye al punto de vista mas bananero que se pueda inventar?

Me voy a dar la libertad de entrar en un off-topic en este hilo porque de otro modo su rant va a quedar sin respuesta (no se cansa de vivir resintiendo a la OTAN, a EEUU, al imperialismo, a los chilenos, a las derechas, etc.?). Veo que en su post Ud. se refiere concretamente a la operación Allied Force en 1996. No solo trivializa las circunstancias que precipitaron la intervención (léase, el genocidio contra la población albano-kosovar a manos del régimen serbio, y el rechazo de Milosevic a los términos propuestos por la OTAN y EEUU en los acuerdos de Rambouillet que hubiesen evitado los males de la campaña aérea), sino que usa esta intervención a modo de ejemplo sobre la mediocridad, atraso y crueldad de la OTAN. También aprovecha para hace eco de cifras falsas.

Pues bien, Carla DelPonte, en el Informe Final del Comité Establecido para Evaluar la Campaña de Bombardeo de la OTAN en Contra de la República Federal de Yugoslavia (todo con mayúsculas porque ese es el nombre del informe) preparado y presentado por las Naciones Unidas, está en desacuerdo con la opinión del forista Centinela de defensa.pe.

A saber:

Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

VI General Assesment of the Bombing Campaign

54. During the bombing campaign, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties, 23,614 air munitions were released (figures from NATO). As indicated in the preceding paragraph, it appears that approximately 500 civilians were killed during the campaign. These figures do not indicate that NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties either directly or incidentally.

55. The choice of targets by NATO (see paras. 38 and 39 above) includes some loosely defined categories such as military-industrial infrastructure and government ministries and some potential problem categories such as media and refineries. All targets must meet the criteria for military objectives (see para. 28-30 above). If they do not do so, they are unlawful. A general label is insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial infrastructure and of government ministries must make an effective contribution to military action and their total or partial destruction must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Refineries are certainly traditional military objectives but tradition is not enough and due regard must be paid to environmental damage if they are attacked (see paras. 14-25 above). The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular media components are part of the C3 (command, control and communications) network they are military objectives. If media components are not part of the C3 network then they may become military objectives depending upon their use. As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective. As a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed by the committee, it is the view of the committee that NATO was attempting to attack objects it perceived to be legitimate military objectives.

56. The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height which can be reached by enemy air defences. However, NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it appears that with the use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.

Resumiendo, es la opinión de las Naciones Unidas (y bueno, hay opiniones y opiniones):
1. La campaña de la OTAN no se condujo con miras a causar bajas civiles sustanciales, ya sea directa o incidentalmente.
2. La campaña de la OTAN atacó blancos que se percibieron como objetivos militares legítimos.
3. La obligación de distinguir (con medidas prácticas) entre objetivos militares y civiles fue efectivamente cumplida en la vasta mayoría de los casos.

Evidentemente en toda campaña se asume cierto (trágico) daño colateral. Las leyes y los usos y costumbres de la guerra reconocen que esto es lamentablemente inevitable y no pretenden aducir que la única guerra legítima es aquella sin bajas ni daños civiles. Se trata de tomar medidas razonables para evitar sufrimiento innecesario de civiles durante el cumplimiento de la misión, y para esto existen metodologías de mitigación de riesgos. En todo caso, compare las conclusiones de las Naciones Unidas sobre la intervención de la OTAN en Serbia (citadas arriba), con la opinión vertida por Amnistía Internacional sobre la intervención rusa en Siria.

Russian air strikes in Syria have killed hundreds of civilians and caused massive destruction in residential areas, striking homes, a mosque and a busy market, as well as medical facilities, in a pattern of attacks that show evidence of violations of international humanitarian law, said Amnesty International in a new briefing published today.

‘Civilian objects were not damaged’: Russia’s statements on its attacks in Syria unmasked highlights the high price civilians have paid for suspected Russian attacks across the country. The report focuses on six attacks in Homs, Idleb and Aleppo between September and November 2015 which killed at least 200 civilians and around a dozen fighters. The briefing includes evidence suggesting that Russian authorities may have lied to cover up civilian damage to a mosque from one air strike and a field hospital in another. It also documents evidence suggesting Russia’s use of internationally banned cluster munitions and of unguided bombs in populated residential areas.

“Some Russian air strikes appear to have directly attacked civilians or civilian objects by striking residential areas with no evident military target and even medical facilities, resulting in deaths and injuries to civilians. Such attacks may amount to war crimes,” said Philip Luther, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Amnesty International.

Más allá de intentos de igualar hacia abajo ("no ya, todos son iguales, YA?"), se dará cuenta que la diferencia es clara. Y también se dará cuenta de que me estoy remitiendo a fuentes con algo más de autoridad (Naciones Unidas, y Amnistía Internacional) que iraqsolidaridad.org.

Su post hace referencia concreta al incidente en que un ataque de un F-15E USAF a un puente impactó un tren de pasajeros en la zona de Grdelica (desde ya note la sutileza: no se trató de un ataque deliberado al tren, sino a un puente). Nuevamente, la investigación de las Naciones Unidas exculpa a la OTAN de responsabilidad deliberada:

1. The Attack on a Civilian Passenger Train at the Grdelica Gorge on 12/4/99

59. It does not appear that the train was targeted deliberately. US Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre stated that "one of our electro-optically guided bombs homed in on a railroad bridge just when a passenger train raced to the aim point. We never wanted to destroy that train or kill its occupants. We did want to destroy the bridge and we regret this accident." The substantive part of the explanation, both for the failure to detect the approach of the passenger train and for firing a second missile once it had been hit by the first, was given by General Wesley Clark, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. [...]

61. The committee has reviewed both the material provided by NATO and the report of Mr. Wenz with considerable care. [...]. Although Mr Wenz is of the view that the WSO intentionally targeted the train, the committee’s review of the frames used in the report indicates another interpretation is equally available. The cross hairs remain fixed on the bridge throughout, and it is clear from this footage that the train can be seen moving toward the bridge only as the bomb is in flight: it is only in the course of the bomb’s trajectory that the image of the train becomes visible. At a point where the bomb is within a few seconds of impact, a very slight change to the bomb aiming point can be observed, in that it drops a couple of feet. This sequence regarding the bomb sights indicates that it is unlikely that the WSO was targeting the train, but instead suggests that the target was a point on the span of the bridge before the train appeared.

62. It is the opinion of the committee that the bridge was a legitimate military objective. The passenger train was not deliberately targeted.

Basta con remitirse a bibliografía para darse cuenta que la evaluación del riesgo de daños colaterales es una consideración que suele estar presente en el CONOPS de fuerzas occidentales. Del libro Vipers in the Storm, del Capt. Keith Rosenkranz, USAF (30 misiones volando F-16C en Desert Storm):

Página 152:

I continued to review the ATO. The wing's first large-force employment was set to occur on day two of the war. The target was the Latifya Scud missile production facility twenty miles southwest of downtown Baghdad. (...) Each aircraft would carry two MK-84s weighing 2,000 pounds apiece.

The ROE was very specific when it came to civilians. Civilian areas throughout the Iraq and Kuwait theater were to be avoided, period.

Página 234:

While everyone updated their maps and lineup cards, Col. Jaszczak walked into the room and reviewed the satellite photo. The park was bordered by a pair of roads -one to the south and one to the west- and by a string of homes directly to the east. After studying the photograph, Col. Jaszczak asked for everyone's attention.

"Take a good look at the right side of this photo", Cash said while holding up the picture. "I don't want any bombs to come near these homes. Is that understood?"

"Yes, sir", everyone answered.

Saddam Hussein was keenly aware that we would never deliberately target Iraqi citizens. That's why the armored vehicles were being stored in a residential neighborhood.

Página 243, sobre el ataque a un bunker anti-bombas en el distrito iraquí de Amariya, que ocasionó lamentables víctimas civiles:

Marine Brig. Gen. Richard I. Neal said American intelligence sources identified the facility as a command-and-communications bunker.

"From a military point of view," Gen. Neal said, "nothing went wrong. The target was struck as designated. From a personal point of view, I'm outraged that civilians might have been placed in harm's way, and I blame the Iraqi government."

According to Capt. David Herrington, an intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the roof was painted in camouflage, and the facility was surrounded by barbed wire.

"Intelligence sources have intercepted dozens of messages being sent from the center to front-line Iraqi forces stationed in Kuwait," Herrington said. "The facility was right across the street from a school and just a short distance from a mosque. Because it was located in the middle of a civilian kinds of facilities, we chose four o'clock in the morning to strike the target. Had we known civilians were in the facility, U.S. warplanes would have never attacked it"

Respecto a la campaña en Yugoslavia (Noble Anvil, la participación americana en Allied Force) y blancos designados como NCD (Non-Collateral Damage; aludiendo a las consideraciones para minimizar el daño a civiles), extraigo las referencias que hace el Lt. Col. William B. O'Connor, USAF, piloto de F-117A, en su libro Stealth Fighter.

Página 317:

The target had been a high-priority radar that covered almost all of northern Serbia and was housed in a small dome. G-Man had to take that out with his first shot so that the foillowing conventional aircraft wouldn't be tracked.

Unfortunately, it was surrounded by several presumably civilian houses. That made it an NCD target. In addition to applying NCD criteria, only the smaller 500-pound GBU-12 bomb was allowed.

Página 311:

I was fragged against an army headquarters building in the very center of the city of Kragujevac. Because of its location, the target had been designated NCD, of course.

Sigue...

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